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Abstract 
 This paper uses pregame spread data to attempt to analyze the efficiency of the NFL 
betting market. I look at hot hand betting, performance during prime-time games, home field 
advantage, and favorites to test for inefficiencies in the market, thereby uncovering a profitable 
betting strategy. Using OLS regression analysis, I find no evidence of a profitable betting 
strategy betting on teams on streaks or home underdogs. However, my results suggest that it 
may be profitable to bet on the home team in prime-time games, regardless of their favorite or 
underdog status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I. Introduction 
In sports economics literature, it is almost universally agreed upon that the betting 
markets are efficient in the long run. This is because informed bettors offset any bias created by 
uninformed bettors (Paul & Weinbach, 2005). As a result, the point spread (the expected point 
differential right before the start of the game) is an efficient, unbiased indicator of the general 
expected outcome. Thus, sports betting markets provide an easy way to study market efficiency 
due to the known payouts and well-defined “end” period.  
However, there may exist certain short-run inefficiencies that bettors can exploit for 
profits. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to find these inefficiencies that can result in a 
consistent profitable betting strategy in the NFL betting market. For instance, some papers 
determine that bettors overvalue home teams because of the “home-field advantage” 
phenomenon (Dare & Dennis, 2011). Conversely, other papers find that bettors overvalue the 
favorites, and that betting on the home underdogs is the way to go. A common misconception 
of bettors is that “hot” teams will continue to do well, thus operating under the hot hand 
fallacy. Other papers look at the strategy of betting against teams who are favored by a large 
margin (Aadland & Wever, 2012). In my study, I look at the accuracy of the spread line as a 
predictor of game outcome, hot hand betting behavior, home field advantage, favorites and 
underdogs, and prime-time performance to test for various strategies. 
In the last decade, sports betting has exploded in the United States. The most popular 
sport to bet on is by far the National Football League (NFL). According to Statista.com, the 
market cap is nearing $1 trillion. The rise of daily fantasy sports (DFS) companies like DraftKings 
and FanDuel has paved the way for consumers to view sports in a different way; one that places 
emphasis on the individual performance of players, and offers payouts to bettors who select 
the best lineup of players in a given game.  Many states are starting to legalize sports betting, 
which has expanded the market even further. The rise of social media has given much more 
exposure to the gambling implications of games (such as a team covering the spread in the last 
minute), as opposed to just the final score of the game. More importantly, these technologies 
allow information to spread much faster and thus make bettors more knowledgeable about 
their wagers.  As a result of all these factors, many papers have attempted to explore the 
  
market in hopes of discovering profitable betting strategies. In economic terms, this can be 
seen as attempting to find inefficiencies in the market.  
Many economists tend to look at the stock market to study market efficiency. However, 
the NFL betting market is much simpler. Thus, economists look to it as a more accessible way to 
study market efficiency. There is a plethora of literature on the efficiency of the stock market, 
and it is generally accepted and assumed that it is efficient in the long run. It is also assumed 
that stock prices reflect all relevant information available to the public (Fama 1970). However, 
the NFL market is a bit different, in that there is a known outcome of every game which 
generally reflects the effort and ability of each team during said game. Thus, the NFL betting 
market is a much more intuitive market to study market efficiency and given its vast increase in 
popularity and exposure, is very much worth exploring in the fields of sports economics and 
finance.   
 While there are many relevant wagers one can put on a single NFL game, there are three 
core bets that make up the majority of the betting market: the spread, the money line, and the 
over/under. The spread is a predicted score differential (away-home) between the two teams. For 
example, if the pregame spread is -7, then the home team is favored to win by a margin 7 or 
more points. Therefore, if one places a wager on the home team against the spread, he or she 
wins the bet if the team wins by 7 or more points and loses if the team either loses outright or 
wins by fewer than 7 points. Payouts for spread betting are one-to-one – that is, a successful bet 
will double the initial wager. Additionally, if the actual score differential is the same as the 
spread, then the bet is a “push” and the bettor gets his or her money back. As a result, 
bookmakers typically use 0.5 spread lines to combat this. Bookmakers also tend to set the spread 
such that there is about an equal number of bets on either side to minimize risk of taking a loss 
and maximize revenue. If the public bets heavily on one side, and that outcome occurs, they lose 
a lot of money. Thus, bookmakers constantly change spreads based on betting volume, new 
information, and bettor sentiment throughout the week 
     The money line is a bet on a team to win the game outright. It is categorized by either a 
positive or negative number, similar to the spread. If the number is positive, then the team is an 
underdog, and thus a riskier bet. The money line number itself represents the payout on a $100 
bet. For instance, if a team is +200, then the bettor wins $200 (plus the initial $100 wager) if the 
  
team wins. Conversely, if a team is favored to win, their money line number will be negative, 
meaning it is a safer bet. If a team is -200, the bettor wins $50 on a $100 bet (oddsshark.com).  
The over/under line is a bet not on who wins the game, but the total amount of points 
scored by both teams. Similar to the spread, the over/under line is typically set in 0.5 terms (i.e. 
47.5 total points). Payouts are one-to-one here as well.  
For the purposes of my study, I will focus just on the money line and the spread, as they 
focus more on the outcome of the game, rather than just the total number of points scored. The 
spread and money line “opening” and “closing” lines. The opening line is typically released the 
day after the previous week’s game is played, comparable to a stock’s price at the market 
opening time. As teams finish their games and look toward their next opponent, so do bettors and 
bookmakers. Throughout the week, these lines move around based on betting volume and 
increased information about the teams (injuries, roster changes, etc.), similar to stock prices. The 
closing line is determined and locked in at the start of kickoff.  
 As mentioned earlier, there may exist certain inefficiencies in the NFL betting market 
that bettors can exploit for profits. In this paper, I will explore a few of these scenarios. First, I 
will conduct an analysis to examine how well the spread predicts the outcome of the game. 
Second, I will examine the role of hot hand betting. When teams are on winning or losing 
streaks, bettors might tend to follow the hot hand. This phenomenon is common in other 
gambling settings (for example, Croson et al., 2005), so I want to see if it has a significant impact 
on the efficiency of the NFL betting market. Third, I will analyze home and away underdogs to 
see if there is a profitable betting strategy in this regard. Some economists claim that betting on 
home underdogs is more profitable than away underdogs (Dare & Dennis, 2011). Fourth, I am 
interested in the impact of a team’s performance during prime-time games. Prime time games 
(Thursday Night Football, Sunday Night Football, and Monday Night Football) tend to have the 
highest viewership of all other games in a given week, and thus might garner more attention 
from bettors. A team’s performance in these games may impact their opening spread for their 
next game. Furthermore, the increased exposure may incentivize players and coaches to put forth 
more effort than they otherwise might.  
  The sequence of this paper will occur as follows: Section II is a comprehensive literature 
review of all relevant economic theories related to my research, as well as similar market 
efficiency and NFL betting market works. Section III discusses my data set and analytical 
  
framework of my study, followed by empirical results in Section IV. Section V is a discussion of 
these results, including betting strategy recommendations based on my results. Section VI 
discusses the limitations of this study and provides insights for future research in this field.  
II. Literature Review 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was developed by Fama (1970). It states that stock prices 
fully and accurately represent all information to the public. It assumes that current stock prices 
are impacted only by current information, and historical performance of stocks is not a factor in 
its present price. It also assumes perfect (and free) information. EMH literature often notes the 
random walk of prices, meaning that no single investor can “beat the market” without taking on 
extra risk because he has no information that is not also available to the public. 
The EMH notes three types of efficiency: weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. 
Weak form is defined as using historical returns and stock prices. Semi-strong form refers to new 
information, such as earnings reports, media coverage, etc.. Strong form is shown through 
something called “monopolistic information,” i.e. information that is not available to the public. 
Generally, Fama (1970) notes that the first two forms generally give us the strongest insights 
with which to test market efficiency. 
There are many drawbacks to the EMH. Nath (2015) critiques this theory for a few reasons. 
Firstly, the 2008 Financial Crisis resulted in many of the traditional finance theories being 
challenged due to “lack of perspective on the markets (Nath, 2015). Nath claims that if the 
assumptions about efficient markets were held, the Financial Crisis would not have occurred. 
Aside from the applications of EMH, the theory itself has also been challenged. Nath (2015) 
claims that there is significantly more information available (social media, investment news on 
the internet, etc.) that no single investor is able to consume every piece of information about a 
certain market. Thus, decisions are influenced more by sentiment and emotion than rationality. 
As a result, the relatively new field of behavioral finance have attempted to explain the 
anomalies that cannot be explained by traditional finance theory. 
Another paper that challenges the EMH is Howden (2009). He notes that a common 
assumption of market efficiency literature is that all individuals interpret information the same 
way. In reality, people value stocks in different ways, and new information might not affect one 
investor as heavily as it might another. He notes that the transaction costs (fees) associated with 
  
stock trading hurts the efficiency of the stock market. As a result, a profitable strategy has to 
account for the commission cost on top of the amount invested. Third, the time it takes between 
locking in a trade and the processing time of the transaction often results in a difference between 
the buying price. The main takeaway of this paper is that the EMH is not realistic enough to 
apply to financial markets. However, it nonetheless serves as a benchmark to analyze markets, 
and applies quite well to the NFL betting market despite these limitations.  
 
The EMH and the NFL Betting Market 
In the NFL betting market, under the assumption of the EMH, there would be no consistently 
profitable betting strategies, under the same assumption that no one can exploit insider 
information. Additionally, the general commission for sportsbooks is about five percent per 
wager (oddsshark.com). Thus, over the long run, there should be a net loss of around five 
percent. However, over the short run, profitable strategies may prove to be successful as I have 
hypothesized.  
One of the more prominent papers that looks at the overall efficiency of the NFL betting 
market is Gray & Gray (1997). Again, the NFL betting market is a simpler, more accessible 
means to study market efficiency because payoffs are known with certainty in advance, which 
clears up much of the ambiguity of other markets like the stock market. The authors include a 
variable in their probit regression analysis that accounts for past performance of the teams. One 
of the main reasons for this is that people tend to follow the hot hand or “herd” in gambling 
(Aadland & Wever, 2012), meaning more people bet on the teams that are hot, or on a winning 
streak. Gray & Gray (1997) find a few profitable betting strategies from their model, such as 
betting on teams that have had strong overall seasons but have had played poorly in recent weeks 
(also known as contrarian strategy). In other words, betting against the public is a potential way 
to exploit this inefficiency in the market.  
This paper builds on ideas from Golec & Tamarkin (1991), who were among the first to 
apply market efficiency tests to the National Football League. They look at data for the 1973-
1987 seasons. Their main contribution is that they add two dummy variables – the favorite status 
and home-away status of the team. Under the assumption of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
these variables would not add bias to the population regression function. However, their results 
show the only profitable strategy over the course of their sample was to bet the underdog 
  
consistently. According to the results, bets on the underdog won roughly 56% of the time. Thus, 
they believe that the NFL betting market is not completely efficient. However, this paper is fairly 
old and the increase in technology (thus more information available to the public) since then 
might affect the results found here. 
Richard Zuber is one of the leading researchers in the field of sports gambling, especially its 
market efficiency. His paper with Gandar and Bowers (1985) is one of the first to use NFL point 
spread data to test the efficiency of the betting market. Their model is an extension of that of 
Pankoff’s (1968).  They incorporate several performance statistics of both teams, based on the 
assumption that the outcome of the game is a function of the collective efforts of both teams. 
They do a piecewise regression function, one for each week of the season. All variables were 
significant with the expected sign (i.e. positive or negative). They conclude that their model can 
be used to predict NFL point spreads due to the “speculative inefficiencies” in the market. 
However, these do not imply market inefficiency as a whole. 
A few years later, Sauer et al. (1988) contradicted the results of Zuber et al. (1985), stating 
that i) the 16-part model created biased and inaccurate results and ii) was too small a sample size, 
as it was only for one season. Sauer et al. (1988) perform the same betting strategies proposed in 
Zuber et al. (1985), and find opposite results (they saw large losses as opposed to the profits seen 
in the Zuber et al. paper). 
Zuber et al. (1988) responded to the criticism by building on their previous research. Their 
sample includes data on the 1980-1985 NFL seasons, using the same variables as their previous 
work, finding no significant inefficiencies in the closing betting lines. Instead of performing 
standard regression tests for efficiency, they use tests for rationality to see if people make 
rational decisions when betting. They create seven tests in total, three of which focus on the 
rationality of betting behavior. Of these tests, none produced profitable results. Therefore, they 
conclude that the market is generally dominated by uninformed bettors, contradicting the claim 
that the informed bettors offset the uninformed bettor inefficiency. This differs from Paul & 
Weinbach (2005), who state that the informed bettors offset the inefficient shift in spreads 
created by uninformed bettors.  
Amundson et al. (2006) extends the work done by Zuber et al. (1985, 1988). However, the 
main variable of interest in their study is the surface on which the game is played. Similarly to 
before, they perform an OLS regression function of the realized point difference on the point 
  
spread, including a dummy variable for if the field is grass or turf. Because bookmakers consider 
overall record (both outright and against the spread), variables for these are included as well. 
Teams whose home field is turf may have trouble playing on grass. However, the results were 
statistically insignificant, meaning that NFL players do not struggle to transition between field 
surfaces.  
Continuing with field conditions, Borghesi (2007) attempts to find a profitable betting 
strategy when considering the weather during football games. The model uses the same 
methodology as Amundson et al. (2006), but includes a variable that captures the difference in 
average temperatures in the away team’s home town and average temperature of the city in 
which the game is played. This is relevant because many bettors believe teams that typically play 
in warmer weather will struggle when on the road against cold-weather opponents. The results 
show support for this belief, and there seems to be an inefficiency in the market here. Betting on 
home teams the northern U.S. when facing an away team from the south seems to be profitable 
according to this study. As a result, weather is something I will include in my analysis. 
 
Home Field Advantage and Favorites 
One of the more common factors that bettors and bookmakers alike consider is the home 
field advantage phenomenon. Historically, the home team tends to perform better than their 
season statistics may reflect. A common strategy in NFL betting is considering the home-
underdog bias. Essentially, this theory assumes that road favorites struggle to cover the spread. 
Thus, bettors may overvalue the success of road favorites. Dare & Dennis (2011) test this theory 
with the goal of uncovering a profitable betting strategy betting on home underdogs (i.e. against 
the road favorites). Using data from the 2005-2011 seasons, they analyze the difference between 
the spread and the actual outcome of the game (mean forecast error). After doing this, they run a 
t-test against 0 to find where there might be bias towards home teams and favorites. Their results 
are statistically significant, indicating a potential profitable betting strategy betting on home 
teams.  
Humphreys et al. (2013) critique the work of Dare & Dennis (2011) to test if the models hold 
true over a larger sample size. Their results are similar, but Humphreys et al. (2013) find that the 
results in both studies are part of a bigger phenomenon going on here. They were able to reject 
the null hypothesis of a 0 mean forecast error for away favorites, but failed to reject the same 
  
null hypothesis for home underdogs. Thus, this study suggests bettors favor teams that have been 
successful in covering the spread (who tend to also be the favorites). They assume (based on 
behavioral economic theory) that bettors tend to bet on better teams (here defined as teams that 
score a lot) because there is higher utility involved with watching higher scoring games. Thus, 
Humphreys et al. (2013) construct a new model using betting percentages on favorites. They try 
to find a profitable betting strategy by analyzing the percentage of winning bets, but find no such 
strategy betting against favorites with this new model. To conclude, bettors prefer betting on 
favorites, but favorites do not cover enough to consistently make profits.  
Fodor et al. (2014) examines holdover bias in the NFL betting market to explore overbetting 
of the favorites early on in the season. During week one of the season, most information on 
spreads relies on the team’s performance last season. Using data from the 2004-2012 seasons, the 
study looks at playoff teams from the prior season playing against non-playoff teams early in the 
season. In the study, the playoff teams only covered the spead 35.7% of the time. These results 
suggest that it may be profitable betting the underdogs early on in the season based on the lack of 
information from early-season play. 
These findings are confirmed by Davis et al. (2015), who claim that week 2 of the season is 
the most likely week for bettors to “beat the market.” Similarly to Fodor et al. (2014), they 
assume that there is less information available early in the season. If a 1-0 team is favored 
against an 0-1 team, then the point spread shifts up to a mean of 5.83 points, which is quite high. 
In this study, they find that underdogs exceed expectations and are thus undervalued. However, 
the EMH is a long-run theory and we cannot draw any conclusions about inefficiencies in the 
market from 1-2 weeks of the season. Nonetheless, it is one strategy that can be analyzed further 
in the future. 
The final betting strategy I want to explore is a team’s performance during prime-time 
games. This element of betting is seldom discussed in NFL betting literature due to the relatively 
small sample size, but one paper that does examine this is Shank (2018). The sample used in this 
study is more up-to-date than those of the previous literature I have discussed to this point. The 
purpose of this more recent sample is to investigate if some of the previous inefficiencies have 
been corrected in the market over time. Shank (2018) finds that it is profitable to bet on the home 
teams in prime time games (Sunday Night, Monday Night, and playoff games). These games, per 
Shank (2018), yielded a 60% winning percentage, with a 67% rate if the home team is the 
  
underdog. Thus, Shank (2018) provides insights that the home-underdog strategy noted in Dare 
& Dennis (2011) is magnified even further when the games are played in prime-time slots. 
However, this paper does not propose any form of regression model, it is simply a historic 
analysis. To my knowledge, no other prominent paper with a similar methodology to mine 
accounts for performance during prime-time. As a result, I hope to contribute to the economic 
discussion of NFL betting market efficiency in this light. 
 
Hot Hand and Representative Heuristics  
Representative heuristics are the mental shortcuts we take to judge probabilities (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974). Simply put, this can be anything that speeds up the time it takes for us to make 
a decision. However, this increased speed often hinders the accuracy of the decision. These 
shortcuts often lead to unfavorable decisions because they cause the individual to overestimate 
the likelihood of a certain outcome based on previous events. Both the gambler’s fallacy and the 
hot hand fallacy are examples of this. 
Broadly defined, the hot hand fallacy is the false or exaggerated belief that an individual’s 
performance varies systematically over the short run. In other words, individuals that act under 
this phenomenon believe that the next outcome of a certain event is likely to be similar to 
previous outcomes (i.e. that outcome is “hot”). For example, in basketball, many fans, players, 
commentators, etc., believe that there is systematic variation in shooting percentage. If the player 
is on a streak of making shots, he is perceived as “hot” and thus his teammates will continue to 
pass him the ball on offense. Applying this to sports betting, bettors may favor teams that have 
won a few games in a row, and are thus “hot.” 
The literature for the hot hand in both sports and gambling is shown in a variety of ways. 
Most of it stems back to a paper written by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) titled “Judgment Under 
Uncertainty.” This work was the first documented discovery of these representative heuristics. A 
plethora of papers followed in the wake of this paper. One of the most groundbreaking was 
Gilovich et al. (1985), who were among the first to discover the hot hand fallacy. Using shot data 
on the Philadelphia 76ers players, they found no evidence of a positive correlation between 
successive shots, thus determining the “fallacy.”  
One of the first field studies on this topic was Croson et al. (2005), who used video footage 
of a roulette table at a casino in Reno, NV as their empirical setting. This paper found evidence 
  
of bettors exhibiting hot hand behavior, in that they were more likely to place subsequent bets 
when they previously won compared to having previously lost. However, this research design 
does not control for the income (i.e. “house money”) effect – the idea that people who have more 
chips than when they started are more likely to bet more money. Additionally, the authors were 
not able to control for the amount of chips that people bet, as the data came from security tapes 
and thus could not capture the amount of chips being wagered. 
Xu & Harvey (2014) examine the hot hand fallacy in online sports gambling. They explored 
three things – whether or not the hot hand fallacy is actually present, the bettor’s beliefs in this 
behavior, and if there is a causal relationship between the gambler’s fallacy (the belief that if 
something happens more frequently than normal it will happen less frequently in the future) and 
the hot hand fallacy. The authors found more evidence of the hot hand fallacy than the gambler’s 
fallacy, consistent with the findings of Croson et al. (2005) as mentioned above. When people 
won, they continued betting on events with “safer” odds. When people lost, they bet on events 
with riskier outcomes. However, the interesting thing here is that people actually believed in the 
gambler’s fallacy. Thus, by operating under the gambler’s fallacy, they actually developed the 
“hot hand.” By this logic, the authors argue that the gambler’s fallacy created the hot hand effect 
in gambling.            
Applying the hot hand to sports betting markets, Paul & Weinbach (2005) assess the effect of 
hot hand betting in the NBA. In their study, they use data from the 1995-2002 seasons. They 
claim that misconceptions of the public can be exploited for profits (i.e. against the hot hand). 
This was first hypothesized by Camerer (1989), who found that it could be profitable to bet 
against teams on winning streaks. Under his hypothesis, point spreads are influenced by the hot 
hand, but the outcomes are not. In Paul & Weinbach (2005), the results indicate that the public 
tends to overbet teams on winning streaks. Furthermore, they find that betting on NBA teams 
with winning streaks of four or more reject a fair bet, and betting against teams on a win streak 
of two or more games was found to be profitable on average. Furthermore, the betting public for 
this sample seems to not pay as much attention to losing streaks as they do winning streaks. This 
might be because there is less utility involved with rooting for a losing team. The main 
takeaways from this paper are that big underdogs, especially home underdogs, are the most 
profitable teams to bet on. 
  
The main insight that Paul & Weinbach (2005) contribute is that bettors tend to overvalue 
teams on winning streaks, since they are “hot” and will likely continue to succeed in their eyes. 
One of the first papers to apply this to the NFL was Woodland & Woodland (2000). However, 
they found no profitable betting strategies betting against streaks. Thus, there is no inefficiency 
betting against the hot hand. However, a limitation of this claim is the assumption that 
bookmakers construct spreads such that they attract an equal amount of bets on each side of the 
line. As a result, spreads for teams on winning streaks are unusually high.  
 There is a large number of variables that bookmakers consider when generating their 
point spreads, over/unders, and money lines. Such variables include field surface (i.e. grass or 
turf), weather, temperature, etc. Amundson et al. (2006) look at field surface, using an OLS 
regression model with observed point difference as the dependent variable and predicted spread 
as the main independent variable, using a dummy variable for if the field’s surface is grass or 
not. Other variables in their model include overall season record and total accumulated point 
spread for the season. Both these variables have been shown to play a large role in bookmakers 
decisions, so their model can analyze the effect of the field on the teams playing in the game. For 
instance, a team whose home field is on turf might have a hard time playing an away game on 
grass. However, the results were insignificant and no profitable betting strategy was found from 
this analysis. 
 
III. Data and Analytical Framework 
My data set contains every NFL game from the 2006-2014 seasons, including preseason, 
regular season, and postseason contests. Certain variables of interest include the result of the 
game, pregame spread, and opening and closing money lines.  It was obtained from Professor 
Mike Lopez in the Skidmore College Mathematics Department. I chose to omit preseason games 
for two reasons. Firstly, people rarely bet on them, so in that regard it is not worth analyzing. 
Second, teams play them differently than regular season games, as they treat them as practice 
games where they can rest their starters to avoid injury and play their less-impactful players to 
give them a shot at making the roster. This method of purposeful omission is also implemented 
by several NFL betting papers such as Gray & Gray (1997), Zuber et al (1988), among many 
others. I also chose to omit Super Bowls, since they are played at a neutral site, eliminating the 
home field advantage phenomenon, which I want to analyze in my study. Finally, not all games 
  
were designated an opening and/or closing money line in the data set. This is potentially because 
they are so-called “pick-em” games, where the teams are evenly matched so bookmakers don’t 
set a line on them. For this reason, I omitted all those games, leaving me with a total of 2,355 
observations over eight seasons.  
Table (1) contains descriptive statistics for my data set. The average home spread was       
-2.94, meaning that on average, the home team was favored to win by a margin of roughly three 
points. In other words, if one were to bet on the visiting team to cover the spread, they would 
either have to i) win outright, or ii) lose the game by fewer than 3 points. The average 
Over/Under line was 43.3 points. However, average total points (home team points + away team 
points) was 44.27. Thus, the O/U line slightly underestimates the total points scored in a game in 
my sample. On average, visiting teams scored roughly 21 points (about three touchdowns per 
game), where the home teams averaged around 23 points. Home teams were generally favored 
on the money line, consistent with the “home-field advantage” phenomenon shared by bettors 
and bookmakers. There is a shift from the opening to closing money line for both the home and 
away teams. This can most likely be attributed to the release of new information throughout the 
week, such as injuries, changes in field conditions, or anything that might impact the outcome of 
the game in the eyes of bettors. Finally, average temperature was 58 degrees in the outdoor 
stadiums. Temperature was not recorded for games played in domes or closed roofs.  
My first step in my methodology is to run a simple t-test against 0 to see if the difference 
between the spread and point differential is statistically significant: 
H0: HomeSpread – PointDifference = 0 
HA: HomeSpread-PointDifference   ≠ 0 
 
I find that the p-value is greater than 0.05, so I fail to reject the null hypothesis. This means that 
on average, the spread is a decent indicator that the spread predicts the score rrelatively 
efficiently. 
As we can see in Table (1), the standard deviations are quite high for the money lines. To 
mitigate this effect on my regression models, I will convert them into a probability function that 
the home team will win, putting it on a 0 to 1 scale. This model was developed by Cortis (2015), 
and is used in various sport economics papers, (Ge 2018, Mani, 2018, among others). The 
equation for this function is shown in equation (1): 
  
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 =
{
 
 +100 (
1 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
) , 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0.5
−100 (
𝑝𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑖
) , 𝑝𝑖 > 0.5
 
In this equation, 𝑝𝑖 represents the probability of team X winning game i. This probability 
is calculated by the bookmakers given all available information. Using these probabilities, I 
regress the observed point difference (here defined as 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) in each game (away score-
home score) on the win probability. This will allow me to predict the spreads for each game. 
According to Card & Dahl (2011), the best fit for this model is a third-order regression function. 
From this regression function, I estimate the spread from the money lines. I use this technique to 
create predicted spreads as a proxy to the spreads themselves, as my sample does not distinguish 
between opening and closing spreads. However, it does include opening and closing money 
lines, so I use this regression to get a predicted opening and closing spread. Equation (2) is 
shown below. 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
My first regression function is a similar model to those of Amundson et al. (2006) and 
Borghesi (2007). It is shown in equation (3). The main dependent variable is the observed point 
differential, while my independent variable is the home point spread. The dependent variable 
PointDiff is assumed to be a function of the collective effort of both teams, as well as the 
exogenous measures impacting that effort (Pankoff, 1965). These exogenous measures serve as 
control variables in my function. They are the stadium type, field surface, and the temperature 
at the start of the game. Stadium type, labeled as Dome in my regression function, is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the field is a dome or closed roof, and 0 if otherwise. Field 
surface, labeled as Grass, takes a value of 1 if the field on which game i is played is a grass 
surface, and 0 if it is any type of artificial turf.   
For the Dome variable, I hypothesize that teams whose home fields are in domes or 
closed roofs will tend to score more. Thus, I expect the sign of the coefficient to be positive. 
However, I do not expect the results to be statistically significant, as the controlled 
environment can be advantageous to the visiting team as well. Additionally, I expect that these 
teams will tend to struggle on the road, as they are not as used to playing outdoors as the 
home team. Similarly, I expect that teams whose home fields are on grass as opposed to turf 
  
will perform better based on the findings of Amundson et al. (2006).  However, I do not expect 
the opposite effect (grass teams playing on the road on turf) to be as impactful. This model is 
shown below in equation (3): 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For game i in season t, if 𝛽1 > 1, the favorite team tends to cover the spread. This can be 
interpreted as a one-point change (increase or decrease in the spread) is linked to a more than 
one-point change in the observed score difference. If 𝛽1 is less than one, then the favorite team 
tends not to cover the spread. If this is the case, a one-point change in the spread is linked to less 
than a one-point change in the actual score difference. I hypothesize that 𝛽1 will be positive, 
meaning that the spread slightly over-predicts the observed score.   
 Next I will explore another model derived by Borghesi (2007) that more closely tests the 
impact of temperature on the outcome of a game. In this model, he simply regresses point 
differential on the pregame spread with the same control variables while adding in a temperature 
squared variable. The model is shown below in equation (4): 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
However, when checking for multicollinearity for this model, I find that the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for Temp and Temp2 are above 5, so there is multicollinearity here. Thus, I do not 
include Temp2 in the rest of my methodology.   
The next part of my analysis is looking at the home-field advantage phenomenon and 
how it plays into certain betting strategies. It is generally accepted that playing at home is more 
advantageous to playing on the road. Historically, home teams tend to perform better. Thus, the 
spreads generally reflect this sentiment. In my sample, the home team is usually favored by 
around 3 points. Furthermore, in the sample, home teams are the favorite approximately 66% of 
the time (1,571 of 2,355).  To go about assessing the home field advantage effect, I include a 
dummy variable for when the home team is the favorite to equation (3). This variable takes a 
value of 1 if team A is the home team, and is also the favorite to win the game, and 0 if 
otherwise. The home-field advantage regression function is shown in equation (5): 
  
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
My hypotheses for this function come from the results of Dare & McDonald (1996) and 
Aadland & Weaver (2010) that the spread coefficient (b1) in this regression function will be 
positive and greater than 1. This would mean that the home favorites tend to cover the spread 
more often than not. I also expect b1 to be greater than the b1 in equation (3), meaning that home 
favorites tend to cover the spread more often than the general favorites do.  
For my prime-time analysis, I incorporate a dummy variable to control for if the game 
takes place during a prime-time slot. I also include the HomeFavorite variable from Equation (5) 
because according to Shank (2018), it is profitable to bet on the home team in prime-time games, 
especially if the home team is an underdog. These games take a value of 1 in my sample if the 
game is nationally broadcasted on Thursday Night Football, Sunday Night Football, or Monday 
Night Football (and 0 if otherwise). I expect similar spread coefficients to my previous models, 
and a significant coefficient for the prime-time variable. The model is below in Equation (6): 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Finally, I will look at hot hand betting behavior by once again regressing the point 
differential on the spread with my controls. However, I will also include winning and losing 
streak variables for both home and away teams as well. If the home team is on a 1-game winning 
streak, then the variable takes a value of 1. When the home team is on a winning streak of 2, the 
variable takes a value of 2. When the home team is on a streak of 3 or more wins, then the 
variable takes a value of 3. Conversely, when the home team is on a 1-game losing streak, then 
the variable takes a value of -1. The same methodology is applied to the rest of home losing 
streaks, as well as the away team winning and losing streaks. Given the possibility of two teams 
on the same streak playing each other, I expect the signs to vary and not have any pattern. 
However, I cannot refer to literature for this, as pretty much all sports economics papers that 
focus on hot hand betting tend to have access to betting volume data instead of just analyzing the 
outcome of the game. The hot hand fallacy is a “fallacy” for a reason, and thus I expect no 
profitable betting strategy from betting against teams on streaks.  Furthermore, I expect no 
significant results. The hot hand model is shown below in equation (7): 
  
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
IV. Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows the initial results of my population regression function shown in Equation 
(3). The spread coefficient was positive at 1.036, meaning a one point change in the spread is 
associated with a 1.036 point increase in observed score differential. The p-value is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The r-squared value is .177, meaning that 17.7% of the variability in 
my sample is explained by my regression function. This is fairly strong. Due to the uncertain 
nature of sports, I doubt that I will be able to come up with a model that consistently predicts the 
outcome of a given game since so much can happen to change the odds of it. The other 
significant variable was Grass, meaning that teams whose home field is played on grass as 
opposed to turf tend to perform better against the spread. The coefficient for Grass is 2.523, 
which is quite large. The temperature and dome variables were not significant.  
Table (3) shows the results of Equation (4), where I extend my initial regression function 
to include an additional control for temperature. Again, the spread coefficient is significant at the 
1% level. Here, a one point change in the visiting spread is associated with a 1.036 point 
decrease in observed score differential. The R-squared is the same as in table 3, and the 
temperature-squared term is insignificant (p-value = 0.553). Thus, we cannot say for certain that 
temperature has an impact on the outcome of the game. Furthermore, this model has 
multicollinearity per my robustness check, so I do not include Temp2 in the rest of my models.  
 Table (4) shows the regression results for equation (5). The home spread had a positive 
significant coefficient of 1.120, meaning a one-point change in the spread is associated with a 1-
point increase in point differential. The home favorite coefficient was -1.298. To interpret this, 
we would say that if a team is the home team and the favorite, they tend to score 1.298 fewer 
points than expected. However, the p-value is 0.273, so the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Consistent with my previous models, the Grass coefficient was statistically 
significant with a coefficient of 2.531. My Temperature and Dome coefficients were not 
significant. The R2 was 0.177, similar to my previous models.  
 In Table (5), the results for the prime-time analysis are shown. Home Spread was positive 
and significant at the 1% level with a 1.040 coefficient. Grass was also significant at the 1% 
  
level with a 2.503 coefficient. Dome and Temperature were insignificant with coefficients of 
0.878 and 0.012, respectively. PrimeTime had a negative coefficient of -1.510 and was 
significant at the 10% level. This indicates that for the most part, the score difference is closer in 
prime-time games than otherwise. Since the score difference is categorized as away score minus 
home score, this result shows that the home team tends to perform better in prime-time games. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Shank (2018), confirming my hypothesis. Perhaps 
the p-value will become more significant with a larger sample size. After, there are significantly 
fewer prime-time games played per season.  
 Table (6) shows the results for the model that incorporates the home favorite term from 
equation (5), paired with the Prime-Time analysis from table (5). Similarly, Home Spread and 
Grass were statistically significant at the 1% level. PrimeTime was again statistically significant 
at the 10% level. HomeFavorite had a positive coefficient of 0.661 but was not statistically 
significant. This suggests that the home teams tend to do better in prime-time games, regardless 
of if they are the favorite or not. Shank (2018) finds a significant winning percentage of home 
underdogs in prime time games, so my results differ from him in this light.  
 Table (7) shows results for the hot hand model. As expected, Home Spread and Grass 
were statistically significant and positive as with all other models. The coefficients for all home 
and away winning and losing streaks had inconsistent signs and were not statistically significant. 
I expected teams on winning streaks to perform better and teams on losing streaks to perform 
worse. This would mean the coefficients for home winning streak and away losing streak would 
be negative, while away winning streak and home losing streak would be positive. However, my 
results show that home teams on two or three (or more) winning streaks to favor the away team. 
Additionally, the results favor away teams on one or three game winning streaks. The home team 
is favored when they are a two game losing streak or when the away team is on a one or two 
game winning streak. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant, so we cannot 
conclude that hot hand betting is a profitable strategy.  
 For the above models, I perform a few robustness checks. First, I check for 
heteroskedasticity. I perform a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity for my models. For all 
models, the p-value for the test was greater than 0.05, so I fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
constant variance, confirming that there is no heteroskedasticity. Since I am using panel data, I 
test for multicollinearity by obtaining the VIF’s for my regression function. The VIF’s are shown 
  
below in table (8).  They are all fewer than 5, meaning that there is no imperfect multicollinearity 
in my model. I also perform a Hausman test to decide whether I should use a fixed effects or 
random effects model. I fail to reject the null hypothesis, so I use a random effects model.  
 
V. Discussion of Results 
 Equation (3) is a standard OLS regression that examines the relationship between 
observed point differential and pregame spread, stadium type, field conditions, and temperature. 
Results are displayed in Table (2). The significant coefficients are b1(spread) and b3(grass). Both 
are significant at the 1% level. Per the EMH, if the NFL market is efficient, then the coefficient 
for b1 should be 1. In other words, the relationship between the spread (usually made by Nevada 
bookmakers) and the actual point differential should be a 1:1 ratio. Thus, there do in fact exist 
inefficiencies in this market.  
 The dome coefficient (b2) is positive, which implies that playing in a dome actually 
favors the away team (spread is calculated as away points – home points), holding all other 
variables constant. It is statistically insignificant, however. The grass (b3) coefficient is 
statistically significant with a positive coefficient of 2.52. This is one of the more valuable 
insights of this paper. Road teams tend to perform significantly better when they play on grass as 
opposed to turf.  
Temperature (b4) was also positive, which means that increases in temperature favor the 
away team while decreases in temperature give the home team the advantage. However, we 
cannot draw any reasonable conclusions from this, as the p-value is quite high at .573. This result 
differs from the results of Borghesi (2007), who find statistically significant results for changes 
in temperature on the outcome of the game.  
In Equation (4) I implement a temperature-squared term to further assess the impact of 
temperature on the outcome of the game. The coefficient is quite small and is insignificant, so no 
insightful conclusion can be drawn from this model, other than that temperature is not a great 
indicator of the score of the game.  
Equation (5) looks at the home field advantage phenomenon as it relates to the spread. 
Similar to my previous models, Dome and Temperature variables are statistically insignificant. 
HomeFavoriteit variable is -1.298, indicating that when the home team is the favorite, the score 
  
should decrease and when the road team is the favorite, the score should increase. The p-value is 
statistically insignificant at 0.273, but it is an interesting phenomenon nonetheless.  
My hot hand model analyzes how teams on streaks perform relative to teams not on 
streaks. The signs for all coefficients for home and away winning/losing streaks were 
inconsistent across the board and insignificant, suggesting that there is not a profitable betting 
strategy betting on or against teams on streaks. This paper does not consider betting volume, but 
other papers that analyze hot hand betting focus more on the behavior rather than the actual 
results. Thus, I cannot say for certain how bettors perceive teams on streaks; I can only suggest 
that there is not a conclusive strategy when considering the streakiness of a team.  
My prime-time model yielded a statistically significant PrimeTime coefficient, suggesting 
that the home team tends to benefit from playing their games in the national spotlight. However, 
I could not draw any conclusions about the favorite or underdog status of the team due to the 
high p-value of HomeFavorite. Nonetheless, there could be a profitable betting strategy when 
considering prime time games. However, bookmakers might be aware of this and set their odds 
such that uninformed bettors lean more toward the away team. 
While much of the literature looks at the opening and closing spreads to look for 
inefficiencies, I did not have that data available to me. As a proxy, I want to replicate this 
methodology using the opening and closing money lines in the future. This is important because 
these changes over the course of the week can provide valuable insights into bettor sentiment 
with the release of new information. For instance, in finance theory, investors tend to overreact 
to new information (Howden, 2009). Thus, when the spread (or money line) shifts, it is due to 
new information and can cause bettors to overreact, thus shifting the lines more than they should. 
 
VI. Limitations and Extensions 
 One of the primary limitations of my study is that I did not have access to betting 
volume data. This limited me from being able to observe betting behavior with spread changes, 
prime time games, hot hand betting, etc. Access to betting volume would bring light to whether 
bookmakers use imbalanced books as a tool for profit maximization. Another limitation that my 
work does not account for is the opening and closing spreads. To account for this, I used closing 
money lines as a proxy to predict the spreads in Equation (1). As a result, these are not the true 
spreads, which could result in some bias. Additionally, I did not look at the shift in spreads 
  
throughout the week. This is because an assumption of my study is that the closing spreads are 
the best indicator of the outcome of the game. Furthermore, I did omit all Super Bowls, which 
are among the most heavily bet sporting events in the world. However, this is not as big a 
limitation as the previous two. 
 When including my streak variable, I was unable to control for the “bye week,” which is 
the one week in the season between weeks 4 and 12 (each team has a different one) where the 
team does not play. I was unable to create a variable to control for this, as my data set was 
constructed in a way that did not display when the bye week was.  
 I used OLS for my analysis which has its benefits. However, many bettors are only 
interested in if their bets win or lose, and not the margin of victory or defeat. Thus, there is a 
strong case for a probit model being a more appropriate means of analyzing efficiency. This is 
because probit models do not account for the excess points by which a team covers the spread. 
Some papers do use probit models for their analytical frameworks, but I chose to go with OLS 
for reasons stated in section III. 
Finally, I found multicollinearity in one of my models (results shown in table (4)) with the 
addition of the temperature2 term, so I was unable to include this in the rest of my analysis. 
According to Borghesi (2007), the paper on which this model is based, the weather favors 
teams playing in the north. However, I was unable to continue with my analysis of this due to 
the multicollinearity here.   
 Despite the limitations of my study, I believe it can open some doors for potential future 
research. First, one of the main findings in this study is that field surface has a significant impact 
on the outcome of the game. Only one paper lightly touches on this (Amundson et al., 2006). 
Thus, more work can be done on this to see if the visiting opponent’s home surface is 
significant as well. Second, my prime-time coefficient was positive but insignificant.  However, 
Shank (2018) notes a 60% covering percentage on home teams during prime time games. A 
potential avenue for future research is relating the hot hand betting to prime-time 
performance. I would suggest analyzing the opening spread for a team the week following a 
prime-time game. They might be overvalued if they do well and undervalued if they get beat. 
  
 The prime-time and hot hand biases could be linked together in future research as well. 
In most literature that looks at the shift in spread throughout the week, hot hand biases are 
more often observed early in the week. We could see some this effect magnified with teams 
who played on prime-time the week before. Further research using early-week spreads might 
shed some more light on bettor perception of teams on winning or losing streaks.  
 There is a large volume of literature relating home field advantage and favorites. Some 
proves that the home team’s ability to score is underestimated by bettors, while some find the 
opposite. Some papers suggest that large underdogs receive more hype than not (meaning a 
lower spread than expected). The point is that the literature is inconclusive on the home field 
advantage phenomenon and how to bet favorites. Finally, applying a different methodology 
(probit and mean difference error are the two most common across sports betting literature) 
could net different results.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 This paper uses spread and money line betting data to expose short-run inefficiencies in 
the NFL betting market. I convert the closing money line into a predicted spread line. I test 
multiple conditions that bettors tend to pay attention to when considering placing a bet on a 
game. These are prime-time games, betting on teams on streaks (hot hand), and home field 
advantage/favorites. Most of the literature and economic theory behind this paper suggest that 
the closing lines are the best indicator of the outcome of the game since the most information 
is available by that time. My results indicate that the spread overpredicts the observed point 
differential, but not enough to expose a long-run inefficiency. However, there is a profitable 
betting strategy betting on home teams in prime-time games. Additionally, home teams whose 
fields are played on grass tend to perform better than those who play on turf. This finding, 
while statistically significant in my analysis, requires further research to investigate. 
 The NFL betting market provides a more accessible (and interesting) alternative method 
to test market efficiency. It serves as a good proxy to something like the stock market because 
it is extremely difficult to test the validity of the EMH due to the vast amounts of information, 
the true value of a stock, or the uncertainty of decision-making. In the NFL betting market, the 
  
outcomes and payouts are known. Furthermore, the probability distributions are known (via 
the money line), so bettors have less ambiguity when making a bet than investors do when 
considering a stock.  
  In the stock market, investors tend to overreact to price shocks, but the market tends to 
correct itself over time. However, the NFL betting market does not have time to correct itself, 
as the bets are locked at the start of the game. Overreaction in the NFL is usually attributed to 
new information coming out about the teams. If this information can be distributed more 
efficiently, then maybe the market can run more efficiently. The inefficiencies found in the NFL 
betting market could also be a driving force behind why it remains illegal in many states. The 
uncertainty and unpredictability of sports, while providing common spectators with an 
entertaining leisure activity, is the main reason why gambling on is wildly addictive and can 
often lead to huge losses. 
 Through testing the efficiency of the NFL betting market, I conclude that it is overall 
efficient in the long run, but there are certain strategies that give a better chance at yielding 
profits. One caveat of my research is that I pooled all seasons together, instead of conducting 
my analysis on a season-by-season basis. Certain strategies might be profitable in one season 
but not another (like those found in Zuber et al. 1988). This might be the case, as football has so 
much uncertainty to it. Any team can beat any team on a given day. One explanation of the 
overall efficiency is the recent increase in technology and information between the teams and 
the public. Social media and the internet provide instantaneous information for the fans and 
bettors, so things like injury updates and field conditions come at the click of a button, which 
was not the case in previous literature. This means that with more information available, 
bettors are better informed and thus make the market more efficient.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix: Tables of Results 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Spread 2355 2.94 5.89 -14.5 26.5 
O/U 2355 43.3 4.56 31.5 59 
Visiting Points 2355 20.96 10.14 0 59 
Home Points 2355 23.3 10.5 0 62 
Opening VML 2355 66.86 209.73 -625 1250 
Opening HML 2355 -95.68 222.07 -2500 565 
Closing VML 2355 63.64 216.2 -850 1500 
Closing HML 2355 -93.75 227.66 -2400 671 
Total Points 2355 44.27 14.05 9 99 
Temperature 1936 58.85 16.24 -1 99 
 
Table (2) 
Variable Coefficient 
HomeSpread 1.036*** 
(0.053) 
Dome 0.890 
(1.261) 
Grass 2.523*** 
(0.708) 
Temperature 0.014 
(0.020) 
Constant -2.043 
(1.268) 
R-Squared 0.177 
Observations 2355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
Table (3) 
Variable Coefficient 
(St.Err) 
Home Spread 1.036*** 
(0.053) 
Dome 0.934 
(0.74) 
Grass 2.537*** 
(0.709) 
Temperature 0.014 
(0.020) 
Temperature2 0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -1.616 
(0.848) 
R-Squared 0.177 
Observations 2,355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table (4) 
Home Spread 1.120*** 
(0.094) 
Home Favorite -1.298 
(1.183) 
Dome 0.859 
(1.227) 
Grass 2.531*** 
(0.718) 
Temperature 0.014 
(0.020) 
Constant -1.409 
(1.362) 
R-Squared 0.177 
Observations 2,355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table (5) 
Variable Coefficient 
Home Spread 1.040*** 
(0.054) 
Dome 0.878 
(1.226) 
Grass 2.503*** 
(1.095) 
Temp 0.012 
(0.020) 
PrimeTime -1.510* 
(0.847) 
Constant -1.691 
(1.248) 
R-Squared 0.178 
Observations 2355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table (6) 
Variable Coefficient 
Home Spread 1.078*** 
(0.079) 
Dome 0.846 
(1.227) 
Grass 2.510*** 
(0.718) 
Temp 0.012 
(0.020) 
PrimeTime -1.499* 
(0.847) 
HomeFavorite 0.661 
(0.993) 
Constant -1.340 
(1.355) 
R-Squared 0.178 
Observations 2355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table (7) 
 
Variable Coef 
Home Spread 1.036*** 
(1.261) 
Dome 0.890 
(1.261) 
Grass 2.523*** 
(0.708) 
Temp 0.014 
(0.020) 
1HomeLoseStreak 0.026 
(0.858) 
2HomeLoseStreak -0.729 
(1.122) 
3HomeLoseStreak 0.634 
(1.085) 
1HomeWinStreak -0.102 
(0.858) 
2HomeWinStreak 0.593 
(1.155) 
3HomeWinStreak 0.389 
(1.152) 
1AwayLoseStreak 0.871 
(0.813) 
2AwayLoseStreak -0.510 
(1.149) 
3AwayLoseStreak 0.723 
(1.254) 
1AwayWinStreak -0.689 
(0.885) 
2AwayWinStreak -0.536 
(1.117) 
3AwayWinStreak 0.166 
(1.120) 
Constant 0.227 
(1.493) 
R-Squared 0.177 
Observations 2355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
 
Table (8): VIF Results (Equations 3-7)  
 
Equation (3) 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 1.020 0.977 
Dome 1.240 0.804 
Grass 1.250 0.801 
Temp 1.080 0.977 
Mean VIF 1.150 
 
 
Equation (4) 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 1.023 0.977 
Dome 1.245 0.804 
Grass 1.256 0.796 
Temp 28.969 0.035 
Temp^2 28.957 0.035 
Mean VIF 12.29 
 
 
Equation (5) 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 2.21 0.452 
Dome 1.245 0.803 
Grass 1.249 0.801 
Temp 1.08 0.926 
Home Favorite 2.191 0.456 
Mean VIF 1.595 
 
 
 
  
 
Equation (6) 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 1.025 0.976 
Dome 1.243 0.804 
Grass 1.249 0.80 
Temperature 1.079 0.927 
Prime Time 1.003 0.997 
Mean VIF 1.12 
 
 
Equation (6) w/ added Home Favorite term 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 2.211 0.452 
Dome 1.245 0.803 
Grass 1.249 0.80 
Temperature 1.081 0.925 
Prime Time 1.004 0.996 
Home Favorite 2.192 0.456 
Mean VIF 1.497 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Equation (7) 
 VIF 1/VIF 
Home Spread 1.022 0.978 
Dome 1.246 0.802 
Grass 1.25 0.800 
Temperature 1.07 0.934 
1HomeLoseStreak 1.002 0.998 
2HomeLoseStreak 1.112 0.899 
3HomeLoseStreak 1.003 0.997 
1HomeWinStreak 1.052 0.950 
2HomeWinStreak 1.026 0.974 
3HomeWinStreak 2.012 0.497 
1AwayLoseStreak 1.024 0.976 
2AwayLoseStreak 1.046 0.956 
3AwayLoseStreak 1.092 0.915 
1AwayWinStreak 1.01 0.990 
2AwayWinStreak 1.72 0.581 
3AwayWinStreak 1.1 0.909 
Mean VIF 1.1741875  
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